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ABSTRACT
Deception is typically regarded as a morally impoverished choice.
However, in the context of increasingly intimate, connected and
ramified systems of online interaction, manipulating information
in ways that could be considered deceptive is often necessary, use-
ful, and even morally justifiable. In this study, we apply a spec-
ulative design approach to explore the idea of tools that assist in
pro-social forms of online deception, such as those that conceal,
distort, falsify and omit information in ways that promote sociality.
In one-on-one semi-structured interviews, we asked 15 participants
to respond to a selection of speculations, consisting of imagined
tools reifying particular approaches to deception. Participants re-
flected upon potential practical, ethical, and social implications of
the use of such tools, revealing a variety of ways such tools might
one day encourage polite behaviour, support individual autonomy,
provide a defence against privacy intrusions, navigate social status
asymmetries, and even promote more open, honest behaviour.
Keywords
Deception; disinformation; speculative design; autonomy; privacy
Categories and Subject Descriptors
H.5.m. [Information Interfaces and Presentation (e.g. HCI)]:
Miscellaneous
1. INTRODUCTION
Most people like to consider themselves to be quite honest in
their communications with friends, family and acquaintances. How-
ever even honest people routinely modulate what they share, omit-
ting or even falsifying information in order to reduce social friction,
avoid confrontation, diffuse awkward situations, or to save face [14,
15]. Hancock et. al. introduced the term butler lies to refer to
a common use of simple lies to manage communications, such as
to smoothly exit from an unwanted conversation [33]. Online, the
notion of who our ‘friends’ are has become increasingly blurred
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and difficult to define. In such settings, people commonly navigate
different social spaces, projecting and varying self-presentation ac-
cording to the ways they want to be perceived by each [40].
Whilst part of tailoring one’s presentation to an audience is the
ability to carry out some level of deception, with personal commu-
nications, there is an implicit expectation of authenticity [7]. How-
ever, online, the need to navigate multiple and uncertain audiences
means that we may constantly vary our self-presentation. Authen-
ticity becomes a social construct derived from the social context
and how we wish to be perceived by a given audience [12]. We
may be deceiving, at least to some extent, nearly constantly with-
out even being conscious of it.
The use of deception as a technique for system designers has
been discussed previously within the HCI community. For exam-
ple, manipulation of users’ mental models of systems in ways that
benefit both systems’ designers and end-users were documented
by Adar et al. [1]. Ambiguity, often promoted through deception,
gives people space for flexible interpretation [29], and to tell sto-
ries they need to in order to preserve face and reputation [7, 10].
However, the complexity of modern social software means that a
growing cast of actors have to be considered, both human and com-
putational, as targets, confederates, dupes and adversaries for any
action.
Here, we are interested in exploring the complex contexts in
which deception might take place, to consider not just cases where
the system lies to a user [1] or computer mediated communication
where one user lies to others, but situations where systems lie to
each other about users; where a user needs to lie to one audience
but not another; where tools or systems might protect a person from
disclosure to other systems or tools. As Nissenbaum puts it:
Those who imagined online actions to be shrouded in
secrecy have been disabused of that notion. [. . . ] We
have come to understand that even when we interact
with known, familiar parties, third parties may be lurk-
ing on the sidelines, engaged in business partnerships
with our known parties. [44]
The actors involved now include not just the people who are be-
ing immediately addressed, but others who are peripheral or inci-
dental to the interaction as it occurs. Many systems include silent
‘lurkers’, who observe without speaking. Others will discover and
read conversations later, outside the context of their production.
Beneath the visible surface of the communications tools people use,
a growing series of invisible actors mine the interaction data which
occurs on their platforms, and others use the results of this min-
ing. Many of these actors are computational systems of increas-
ing power, sifting, sorting, re-purposing and inferring from the full
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spectrum of communicative data.
The contributions of the paper are as follows:
• A summary of recent work on deception in HCI, with a focus
on its use in systems and tools;
• An expansion upon previous models of computer-mediated
social deception with new configurations, in which tools con-
duct or facilitate deception towards other people/systems/tools;
• A description of a speculative design experiment in which re-
flections on fictional tools for social deception were elicited;
• A characterisation of the practical, ethical, moral, & social
perspectives on the use of such tools, along with design guide-
lines for future tools employing deception in social contexts.
2. BACKGROUND
Deception has long been studied, both within and outwith the
HCI community. Traditionally, deception has been cast in a neg-
ative light [11], to be used only if no other option is available. In
the 1980s, however, communications researchers began to investi-
gate the positive aspects of lying, in particular white lies—socially
acceptable lies which cause little or no harm to the recipient [16].
In 1992, McCornack cast deception as an understandable response
to complexity: “[r]esearchers studying deception recently have be-
gun to argue that deceptiveness is a message property that reflects
a kind of functional adaptation to the demands of complex commu-
nication situations” [41]. People then manipulate the information
which they share as a necessary part of participation in society. This
has led to recent work on the positive aspects of deception in hu-
man computer interaction, in particular how ‘butler lies’ are used to
ease social situations [33], and how systems can deceive their users
for beneficial reasons [1].
Several different taxonomies of lying and deceptive behaviours
have been proposed [16, 21, 38]; Anolli et al. examined a family of
deceptive miscommunications, including self-deception and white
lies [6]. They look at omission of relevant information, conceal-
ment using diversionary information, falsifaction and masking with
alternative, false information. Of particular interest is their claim
that “a deceptive miscommunication theory should be included in
a general framework capable of explaining the default communi-
cation”, that is that deception should not be seen as a psycholog-
ically different activity than ‘normal’ communication. This tallies
with the earlier approach of McCornack [41] who situates deceptive
messages within the spectrum of information manipulation. This,
combined with the lens of Gricean maxims, allows for an explana-
tion of deceptions where some of the truth is told, but information
which the speaker knows is relevant to the listener is omitted or
obscured [31].
Motivations for lying have also been extensively studied in so-
cial psychology. Turner et al.’s taxonomy included saving face;
guiding social interaction; avoiding tension or conflict; affecting in-
terpersonal relationships; and achieving interpersonal power [50].
Camden et. al. [16] develop a detailed categorisation of lies to do
with basic needs, managing affiliation with others, self-esteem and
miscellaneous practices such as humour and exaggeration. A re-
cent study of online behaviour found that the most common self-
reported motivation for online lies was either to make one’s life
seem more exciting, or to downplay personal difficulties. Responses
also included avoiding harassment and a range of creative endeav-
ours alongside more clearly adversarial deceptions [34].
Another strand of research borrows from information warfare,
to look at the possibilities for disinformation. Disinformation tac-
tics are most useful when a channel of information cannot be com-
pletely closed, but can be rendered useless by being filled with in-
correct, but plausible, assertions in order to lower its overall signal-
to-noise ratio [51]. The intended target of the lie may not be the
official recipient of the message: lies can be directed at those who
are eavesdropping on the communications channel or surveilling
the participants [5]. Techniques used include redaction to remove
parts of the message, airbrushing to blur parts of the message and
blending to make the message similar to other plausible messages,
as well as other forms of information distortion [5].
2.1 Ambiguity, Distance, Social Privacy
These properties of communication channels—the transparency,
and the amount of context which is conveyed relate to notions of
distance. Birnholz et. al [10] look at different aspects of ambigu-
ity in setups ranging from radically co-located to physically sepa-
rated teams. They found that people who were co-located manage
the release of information in order to maintain a sense of auton-
omy. Ambiguity was used to allow the hearer to believe a particular
story, with social constructs forbidding intrusiveness being lever-
aged to maintain the space for ambiguity—for example, a norm
against ‘screen-surfing’ and looking at a colleagues monitor allows
a flexible explanation of exactly what one is working on.
Aoki and Woodruff [7] pick up on a need for ambiguity within
personal communication systems, not for explicit lies, but to al-
low the participants space in which to construct mutually agreeable
stories. If one’s online activity—or read receipts—are visible, the
kind story about being too busy to reply becomes problematic. This
impinges on our ability to carry out face-work, and project desired
images. Gaver et. al. examine different types of ambiguity [29],
of information, context and relationship, and suggest avenues for
their use in HCI—the completely unambiguous “Seen at 12:57pm”
could be altered in many ways to soften it and allow more space for
interpretation.
Burgoon et. al delineates four different dimensions of privacy:
physical, being free from surveillance and intrusions into one’s
space; social or interactional, controlling the ‘who, what, when and
where’ of encounters; psychological, freedom to introspect, anal-
yse and so on, and freedom from persuasive pressures; and insti-
tutional, the ability to control who gathers what information about
oneself and under what circumstances [15]. Raynes-Goldie [46]
finds that while young people are happy to abandon institutional
privacy to pragmatism, the social aspects of privacy remain tightly
held.
The social aspects of privacy relate to what DeCew terms expres-
sive privacy—a freedom from peer pressure and an ability to ex-
press one’s own identity [20]. Nissenbaum’s contextual integrity [44,
45] seeks to understand appropriate sharing, looking at the ways in
which flows of information are governed by norms, which may eas-
ily violated as technological systems repurpose and share data.
2.2 Pervasive Surveillence and Privacy Tools
We are rapidly moving into a world where information about
nearly every aspect of our lives is becoming sensed, recorded, cap-
tured and made available in digital form. Data is captured and
shared voluntarily, as tools invite ever more intimate participatory
surveillance [4]. While the abundance of information traces has un-
locked a wide range of new kinds of applications (eg. [3] [19]), the
creation and potential for disclosure poses new threats to individual
privacy and autonomy. The overall lack of transparency by manu-
facturers regarding how they are capturing and handling personal
information has created a heightened sense of unease among many,
in addition to the potential threats dealing with their unintentional
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Figure 1: Common information transmission vectors in a stan-
dard computer-mediated communication setting. Platform(s)
represents carriers/service providers enabling the communica-
tion; blue arrows denote channels controlled by the individual,
while dashed arrows denote invisible channels out of their con-
trol. Communication with a particular group of people may
end up being shared with others through context collapse [12],
or through leakage to friends of friends. Ex-friends can use so-
cial engineering to elicit data which was not shared with them,
or carry out cloaking attacks [39]. Data may be mined and
analysed, often violating contextual integrity [44], and repur-
posed for use in advertising, surveillance and so on.
disclosure or misuse [27, 42, 26].
Many tools — indeed, entire research fields — have been ded-
icated to researching tools that carry out various kinds of digital
deception for the purpose of protecting the individual’s privacy.
Without aspirations of comprehensiveness, we mention some here.
Tools for masking identity are currently available for all levels of
the software stack, from tools like tor for masking the origin and
destination at the network level [22], to privacy-enhancing fea-
tures at the browser level. Such browser features include Do Not
Track [49], user-agent spoofing, and tracker and cookie-blocking
capabilities [25]. At the application level, anonymous e-mail re-
mailers [32], anonymous e-Cash and cryptocurrencies [17], and
anonymous secure file sharing systems [47] have started to sup-
port certain activities offering guarantees of privacy under specified
conditions.
3. DECEPTION INMEDIATED SOCIAL SIT-
UATIONS
One of the striking aspects of deception is how little it changes
with the advent of computationally mediated communications. The
added distance may allow people to lie more, and justify to them-
selves more easily [43], but many of the motivations and techniques
remain similar.
However, one of the key differences is in the context in which
deception takes place. Mediated communication brings an oppor-
tunity for many different structures of deception, for several rea-
sons:
• Imagined audiences [40] and understanding of publics in dig-
ital space are increasingly complicated.
• The individual may wish to provide false information to the
communications platform where the interaction is taking place,
for reasons including privacy, mistrust of the platform provider,
or dislike of targeted advertising.
• The individual may wish to manipulate the secondary data
which is derived from their actions, such as controlling the
summary data given to their insurance company.
• Deceptions can work in either or both directions: platforms
may deceive some or all of their users, autonomously or due
to the will of their designers and commissioners.
• People often communicate with platforms through some in-
termediary, such as an app on a mobile phone. These in-
termediaries can deceive the platform on behalf of the user,
especially about what information is being automatically col-
lected (eg. through sensors).
• As well as being targets of lies, others can be enlisted to lend
credence to statements, for instance supporting alibis, agree-
ing that the network is down at the moment, and so on.
Some of these actors are shown in Figure 1, and based on this,
Figure 2 shows some structures, along with references to systems
which embody each configuration.
4. STUDY DESIGN
In this study, we wished to explore various positive uses for fu-
ture tools that employ computer-mediated deception. Specifically,
we wished to identify ways that such tools might positively fa-
cilitate the maintenance of sustained, positive social relationships
with others, especially in complex social environments, both in on-
line and hybrid online/oﬄine settings. With respect to deception,
we adopted McCornack’s definition from information manipulation
theory [41], which includes both the introduction of false informa-
tion, as well as selective information disclosure, such as (but not
limited to) for purposes of creating ambiguity, or selective identity
(i.e. omitting information conflicting with one’s desired presenta-
tion).
4.1 Materials, Method and Recruitment
In order to start to understand the practical, ethical and social
implications of the use of computationally-mediated deception in
social settings, we organised a study to elicit perspectives and ex-
periences from people from a variety of backgrounds, around some
of the deception configurations imagined in 2. Drawing inspira-
tion from critical design [9], which takes a critical theory [18] ap-
proach to speculative design, we first generated a series of specu-
lative design proposals [24] in the form of realistic depictions and
descriptions of imagined, “near future” privacy tools. These fic-
tional privacy tools, with accompanying descriptions, which will
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Figure 2: Structures of deception - Depiction of possible decep-
tion configurations involving 1 platform and up to two parties.
henceforth be referred to as vignettes, were then showed to partici-
pants in semi-structured interview settings.
We recruited participants via Twitter, open Facebook groups,
and word-of-mouth through personal connections. Those interested
first answered demographic questions covering age, gender, em-
ployment status and frequency of use of social media. To ensure
diversity in participants, fifteen (aged 18+) were selected in a way
that maximised saturation on the attributes collected. Interviews
were conducted in person and via video chat. At the start of inter-
views, participants were asked an opening question, “How do you
feel about your privacy online?” which was used to their general
attitudes and sensitivity towards privacy online. Then, twwo inter-
view questions were asked of each vignette, first, whether the indi-
vidual would consider using a tool like the one described (and why
or why not), and second, whether their interactions online would
change if they found out their friends were using tools like the one
described. Finally, participants were encouraged to share thoughts
or personal experiences that they were reminded of by the vignette.
Audio from sessions was recorded, transcribed and anonymised
for identifiers of people, places and entities. Inductive thematic
analysis was carried out on the transcripts by analysing and cod-
ing them for themes, by three researchers independently. Themes
were then compiled, combined into a single pool, and discussed to
derive a final coherent set of themes. Then, related themes were
clustered into groups. We organise the result section according to
these groups.
4.2 Designing the Vignettes
We identified two main axes to guide us when crafting the spec-
ulative vignettes. The first was the degree to which machines me-
diated the deception; from tools that simply facilitated, otherwise
manual acts of deception, to those that entirely automated it, and
Figure 3: Participant demographics and responses to questions
pertaining to self-perception of honesty on and oﬄine.
including those that helped people in the post-hoc maintenance of
past deceptions. The second axis, inspired by Gaver’s conceptual
design proposals, seeking to explore the “balance between con-
creteness and openness: [...] specific enough to evoke intuitive
reactions, yet indefinite enough to encourage imaginative exten-
sions” [28]. With respect to realism, we wanted to aim for tools
that would be realisable in the near future, inspired by AugerâA˘Z´s
speculative designs: “speculative designs exist as projections of the
lineage, developed using techniques that focus on contemporary
public understanding and desires, extrapolated through imagined
developments of an emerging technology” [8].
With these axes and guidelines, we generated two dozen candi-
date ideas, and selected five that met the above criteria, were the
most plausible, and that best covered the space spanned by design
axes just described. To break ties, we preferred simpler scenarios,
to encourage participants to focus on implications rather than the
tools themselves. This process resulted in the following final five
vignettes:
Social Steganography (Figure 4) inspired by danah boyd’s stud-
ies of networked teens [13] that used in-group codes to dis-
cuss activities so that they were inscrutable to their parents.
Here, the steganography is performed automatically: a trusted
set of people see the ‘real’ message, while everyone else sees
an ‘innocent’, socially plausible message.
lieCal (Figure 5) creates fictitious appointments based on com-
mon diary structure, to automate the process of deploying
butler lies. Friends can be enlisted to give weight to the lie,
and corroborating evidence is posted on social networks.
lieTinerary (Figure 6) draws on Merel Brugman’s Same Same But
Different, enables the pre-curation of a fictitious trip or fic-
tional event attendance through pre-scheduled, coordinated
posts across multiple social media platforms.
lieMoves (Figure 7) is a fictional service for mobile phones that
replaces the user’s actual location with data from user-selectable
and customisable deception strategies: blurred (low-grain),
superposition of locations, past replay, or “typical” herd-behaviour
or individual simulation.
lieMapper (Figure 8) shows the interconnectedness of communi-
cation channels. Extending Facebook’s ‘this post will go to
X people’ functionality, it works across multiple networks to
visualise all those within one’s friend networks likely to hear
about a particular piece of information.
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Figure 4: Social Stegonagraphy: Diagram illustrating a so-
cial steganography tool for microblogging/SNS sites that hides
“real” messages behind other, plausible status messages but al-
lows certain people to recover the true meaning.
Figure 5: lieCal: Fictional interface for a tool which automati-
cally generates excuses on behalf of the user, optionally includ-
ing friends in the deception and strengthening alibis by posting
on social media.
Figure 6: lieTinerary: Fictional tool to create a narrative of
going somewhere (on holiday) or attending an event, along with
images and social media posts to be sent out at preset times to
corroborate the story.
Figure 7: lieMoves: A fictional smartphone service for letting
people obfuscate their location using various strategies, includ-
ing blurring, substitution, past-replay and impersonation.
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Figure 8: lieMapper: Fictional tool for predicting the flow of
information (e.g. a lie) across a person’s social network starting
from a single friend.
5. RESULTS
Assuming they reported truthfully, the 15 participants we se-
lected covered most of the major attributes in our demographic
categories (see Figure 3). One notable exception is that all par-
ticipants identified as either male or female, and almost half of the
participants were males aged 22–30. We did not collect informa-
tion on race, sexuality or any other attributes which might be used
to identify marginalised groups.
11 participants self-reported using social networks several times
a day, and all but one believed that half or less of their real world
activity was represented on social media. 11 agreed or strongly
agreed that they saw themselves as honest, but only seven agreed
or strongly agreed to seeing themselves as honest online. Nearly
half agreed that they thought their friends were honest.
Pertaining to attitudes towards privacy, 13 reported being at least
somewhat concerned about their privacy online. Based on our cat-
egorisation of participants according to responses to the opening
question, slightly over half fell into the Westin category of privacy
pragmatists, while two fell into the category of privacy fundamen-
talists, and the remaining four were unconcerned about privacy.
(High inter-rater agreement was achieved for this category; Fleiss’s
k = 0.624 for 3 raters and N = 15 participants.) These results show
that in comparison to Westin’s large survey of the American pub-
lic [36], which had a respective breakdown of 55%-25%-20%, we
had relatively few privacy fundamentalists among our participants,
and slightly more of those in the unconcerned category. However,
a meta-survey of privacy indices show that our proportion is com-
parable to more recent results [37].
In the following sections, we first present detailed case studies
of three participants (P8, P9, and P13) to illustrate how individu-
als’ attitudes towards privacy influenced their answers to some of
the vignettes. We follow these descriptions with a presentation of
themes derived from all participants.
5.1 Case study: Privacy and people (P8)
P8 is a former gradeschool teacher who has returned to univer-
sity to get her Ph.D. She started using social media ten years ago
when she was still working at the school, and her role as a teacher
Participant ID Age/Gen Employment Privacy
p1 31-50 f student, parttime unc
p2 22-30 m fulltime prag
p3 31-50 f freelance prag
p4 18-21 m student,parttime prag
p5 22-30 m fulltime unc
p6 22-30 m st, freelance fund
p7 31-50 f student fund
p8 51-65 f student prag
p9 22-30 m student prag
p10 18-21 m student, fulltime prag
p11 22-30 f student unc
p12 22-30 f student prag
p13 22-30 m student prag
p14 22-30 m fulltime unc
p15 22-30 m student prag
Table 1: List of participants by ID with age range, gen-
der (male, female, other), employment status (student, full
time, part time, freelance, unemployed), and Westin Privacy
Scale category (unc=unconcerned, prag=privacy pragmatist,
fund=privacy fundamentalist).
strongly shaped how she managed her exposure online. Specifi-
cally, her role influenced her caution in disclosing too much per-
sonally identifying information, but acknowledged that disclosure
itself was important for fostering relationships and participation on-
line.
“When I was a teacher, I was very careful about what I
said about teaching in school because at that point I’m
not just ’me’, personally; I’m also ’me’ as a teacher,
representing that school I was working at. Since I’ve
stopped being a teacher, I unlocked my twitter feed,
but still try not to post too much personal stuff online.
But really, if you don’t share some personal informa-
tion then you miss out on so much interaction stuff, so
it’s a real balancing act.”
When discussing lieTinerary, she described discovering that her
ex-partner was fabricating extravagant holidays after their breakup
in order to make her jealous.
“[H]e wants me to think, “Oh, I should have stuck with
him - he’s having a really good life!”. So there were
pictures he was putting up [on Twitter] which were
supposedly where he was on holiday, but of course
once you know how to scrape people’s Twitter data,
you could see all of his posts were made in the UK.
And at that point it became really obvious that that’s
what he was doing, so that made me smile.”
She described wanting greater controls to be able to block said
partner from getting around creating new profiles to look at her
information:
“I do know that, if he really wanted to he could easily
set up another account. So in the end, although he’s
blocked [on Twitter] I don’t assume he can’t see what
I’m saying; I assume that he can, and that’s another
reason that I’m a bit careful with what I say. So I wish
it was easier, to stop people from being able to see
what you’re doing – how that would happen I don’t
know – but that would be really helpful.”
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5.2 Case study: Honesty and self-image (P9)
P9 is a 22-year-old recent graduate who is concerned about his
privacy and the security of data he gives out online, in particular
due to a distrust of the guarantees given by companies and platform
providers.
“I’m quite an honest person, [...] like if I was on a
forum and I was talking to someone I’d tell the truth.
But if a company were to ask me for my number or my
name – I won’t bother. ”
Preferring honest approaches, P9 described that he would feel
bad using tools that deceived other people directly, but would feel
especially reluctant to use tools that left digital evidence of such
acts, which would potentially serve as a later reminder:
“Well, um, I imagine [lieCal] would be useful because
it would give me an excuse if I wanted to do some-
thing, but I would probably feel worse [. . . ] because it
would serve as a reminder that I lied – like I’d go back
into my calendar and go, shit, that that day I’d lied, and
that day I’d lied as well – whereas I can just repress it
otherwise. ”
He was confident, however, that there were many people online
that he knew of who would consider using tools like lieTinerary to
promote themselves online, including pretending to go to exclusive
events:
“Well they might use [lieTinerary] to come across as
fashionable or trendy — they might put up a post like
“oh yeah I’m at London Fashion Week” when they’re
not really [...] I could say I’m at Glastonbury for the
weekend, and immediately my cool points would go
up. ”
P9 believed that to a certain extent such fabrication was widespread
already, and small acts of playing one’s self up were already widespread.
“I know people who have paid for likes and followers
and stuff and they hashtag everything to death because
they’re so desperate for attention [...] I used to go on
YouTube, Facebook I used to watch all these cool peo-
ple build up nice communities [...], whereas there are
lots of people nowadays who just want quick success
and they’ll take all of these cheap, cheating routes. ”
5.3 Case study: Privacy and technology (P13)
P13 is a postgraduate student in his mid-twenties; technolog-
ically savvy and uses social networking sites every day. He is
acutely aware of the volumes of data being collected through his
web use, but finds himself weighing up the practicalities of taking
steps to preserve his privacy with his immediate communication
needs, often concluding that "life’s too short" to act on his discom-
fort around third-party software.
“I say what I’m doing on my Facebook because oth-
erwise no-one will ever talk to me [...] I try and use
small bits of privacy enhancing stuff, to whatever ex-
tent they actually work [...] So in the past I’ve had
Facebooks where they’re not tied to my... my lying
even extended to that and all the information on them
was fake. Nowadays I tend not to do that because the
net effect of that is no-one talks to you. ”
He takes steps to manage who sees his data on social media, by
segregating his audience by platform, choosing who to share which
aspects of his self with, and using privacy settings built into the
platforms themselves. Sometimes this leads him to obtain informa-
tion by proxy:
“I don’t connect to my mum’s stuff and I don’t want to
connect to her stuff [...] but I wanted to find something
out and so I remember asking my sister to look it up
for me. ”
He is also resigned to data leakage, and being surveilled, by both
the government and advertisers.
“I don’t think I’m under any illusions about web stuff.
If it’s out there, it’s out there. If someone wants to
find it and knows the information or ways to get the
information then they can get it. It’s annoying, but it’s
a fact of life. ”
This does not stop P13 from providing false information to ser-
vices whenever he has the opportunity, under the impression that
the data many services ask for is superfluous. He speculated that
tools could be useful to generate more believable false data on his
behalf.
“So for instance airport wifi. I spend a large amount
of my time in airports. So I think I’m listed as John
Smith or... [...] So mostly it’s whenever these anony-
mous websites want some personal information that
they don’t tend to have, then I tend to lie [...] But I
always sort of wonder, should I be able to generate
this? ”
In general, he was concerned about the social risks of using tools
to aid online deception,“especially when you can do this social
ways, just going, oh I forgot to use the Google calendar again,” but
was also skeptical about how much he could trust the tools them-
selves.
“If [social steganography] was something that I could
run on my computer and I’d have it disconnected from
the network then maybe. ”
Despite his concerns, P13 expected that he would follow the
status-quo if many people began using these tools, and expressly
supported other people’s right to use them, reasoning that the more
people did so, the more effective they would become. However, he
also anticipated that the output of the tools may be prone to detec-
tion and thus rendered useless.
“You could imagine someone attacking these kinds of
things and trying to start to write distinguishers for
when is this posted by a human or is this posted by
a social media bot. ”
5.4 Effort and Complexity
A common reason why participants wouldn’t use these tools re-
lated to the amount of effort required to use them. P8 observed that
the effort-of-use barrier is a challenge even for tools already avail-
able today, and how platforms were potentially exploiting the lack
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of adoption of these tools to their advantage:
“The thing I’ve noticed is that people will always do
the easiest [thing]. That’s why nobody encrypts. I
don’t. You know, for all my concerns about privacy,
I don’t encrypt anything, [...] very few people take
the extra security steps they can because it’s convo-
luted because you have to make the effort to do some-
thing different. And the minute you ask people to do
that, they’ll just take the easiest route. And providers
like Facebook and Twitter and Whatsapp and all the
apps out there know that, and that’s why it’s so easy
for them to collect data - they know people will just
take the easiest route.” (p8)
However, for some vignettes the extra effort was seen to pay off
as an opportunity. For instance, in response to Social Stenography,
P6 contemplated that by broadcasting different status updates to
distinct subsets of his friends on Facebook, he could control multi-
ple identities simultaneously:
“I think essentially at this point you are projecting two
identities simultaneously and you really would want
to manage both. [...] it almost becomes twice the task.
But the really interesting thing would be if different
groups all had different keys - so you’d send a single
status but they’d all see different ones. That would be
sort of be neat, [to be] projecting multiple identities at
once, because you can’t really do that oﬄine. Finally,
technology would give us a chance to BETTER control
our identities! ” (p6)
A second aspect that was mentioned was not the direct effort
of use, but that indirectly required to stay on top of the wake of
deception left by using such tools. In some settings, participants
noted specific compensatory measures that would be required to
prevent being found out, and noted the complexity and effort of
these measures.
“If I used a tool like this and said I had been in meet-
ings but then actually NOT logged the hours against
the project, what the meeting was about or anything
like that, it would make my accounting for my own
time very hard. [...] It wouldn’t balance, it wouldn’t
add up! So, in a corporate environment I actually think
that’s more problematic because I might end up losing
my job over it.” (p7)
5.5 Availability of Alternate Strategies
The most common reason given for not needing to use a tool
was the availability of an alternative approach in the situation(s)
in which the fictional tools were imagined to be most useful. The
most common such strategy was simply omitting or suppressing
information they did not wish to share; this strategy was used for
the Social Steganography scenario, and lieMoves. The second most
common strategy was the use of alternate channels and access con-
trol features. For instance, participants mentioned Facebook and
Google+’s features for limiting the scope of a particular message
as an alternative to using a steganography approach, as well as di-
rect messages to individuals. P13 discussed the use of encrypted
channels to both help control scope of a message and control for
unwanted leakage by platforms.
In some cases, participants identified that alternate strategies were
imperfect, and sometimes the fictional tool offered a better solu-
tion. For example, the alternate strategy of suppressing location
leakage by turning location tracking off, was perceived as worse
than lieMoves by both P6 and P9, because in suppression meant
that apps that needed location (such as mapping applications, train
schedule applications and location-based chat services) would not
work.
There were fewer alternative strategies given for the other vi-
gnettes; “simply being honest”, and in particular “blocking off time”
was given as a common strategy for situations where lieCal would
be useful (P4, P8, P9).
5.6 Privacy and Control
Several participants cited potential benefits to privacy control
and management. The leaking of location information was a con-
cern; six participants reported keeping location services on their
smartphones turned off by default for reasons such as to prevent
apps from sending their location to third-parties without their con-
sent.
“[lieMoves] would mostly catch out apps that were
taking my location without even asking, because if I
want to tell the truth when I think it matters, I can still
do that, but those that are just spying on me gets crap!
And that appeals, because they shouldn’t be able to
collect in the first place! ” (p6)
P8 asked whether lieMoves was available for use, because she
wanted it immediately to keep Google from tracking her.
“ I want to install it immediately and keep using it for
the rest of my life! I wouldn’t have any ethical worries
about it because I wouldn’t be lying to anyone, I would
be lying to Google, and that’s exactly what I want to
do! Because they shouldn’t have this information in
the first place, so giving them wrong information is
perfect. As I said, can I have this today, please? ” (p8)
She added that some of the tools might bring to users a height-
ened awareness of how their information was being shared. How-
ever, respondents who knowingly shared a lot didn’t see a reason
to be concerned about the spread of their data; for P14 this was due
to his social standing.
“If we lived in a more totalitarian police state and I
were genuinely afraid then I would understand, but
then again I am a straight white male so... I don’t really
have much to fear. ” (p14)
Others felt they had no choice but to share data, or that people
didn’t understand well enough how the services they used operated.
“ People can’t make value judgements about the sys-
tems they interact with because they don’t understand
them well enough yet, especially what’s going on be-
hind the scenes. They don’t actually feel the need to
deceive system and platforms because they don’t even
know they’re being spied upon. ” (p6)
5.7 Authenticity and Self-Image
Participants reflected on how the data they shared affected other
people’s perceptions of them, as well as their perceptions of oth-
ers on social media. P11 (in agreement with P1, P2, P3, P6, P7,
P8, P9, P12 and P15) assumed that her friends engaged in “image-
shaping” by “being quite selective or trying to present a particular
kind of persona”, and described an occasion when a contact’s on-
line presentation was at odds with what she knew to be happening
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oﬄine.
“ People will always seem like they’re having a really
good time and post about how great everything is but
then you talk to them and things aren’t actually quite
how they’re made to be portrayed on social media. [...]
So like one of my friends, her sister was just posting
about her one year anniversary of getting married, and
how brilliant it was, and they were both posting about
the presents they got for each other. Within a month
they were separated [...] I know more about that from
talking to my friend personally, but in terms of what’s
presented online to a different audience, to a much
wider audience, that was not what was going on. ”
(p11)
P12 described a friend who, unable to withhold information or
resist questions from an inquisitive audience, made up stories about
her life to satisfy them, thus creating a persona.
“ ’Cos of the following that some fanfiction gets, she
gets asked a lot of personal questions and she doesn’t
want to feel rude so she just lies, so she answers these
very personal questions so she feels connected to her
audience but she deliberately lies ’cos she finds it some-
times a bit invasive. ” (p12)
P8 and P15 similarly mentioned deception used to protect pri-
vacy without alienating people. In contrast, others saw total open-
ness in their sharing as important for presenting their "authentic"
selves on social media, and thought less of those who they per-
ceived to be engaged in deliberate image-shaping.
“ I wouldn’t be friends with people who would be lying
all the time or who make up stuff just for attention. [...]
I know people who have paid for likes and followers,
but if I found out that there was someone I was quite
interested in doing this [...], the faith I put in them or
the fact that I was being very genuine would take a bit
of a hit. ” (p9)
5.8 Polite Social Signalling and Autonomy
Though sometimes in conflict with attempts at authenticity, a
number of respondents echoed the sentiment that degrees of de-
ception are crucial for maintaining a well-functioning society.
“ I think that not telling people – everyone, everything
– is a central aspect of being kind in the world. ” (p15)
“ It’s about empowerment – little lies, like “I’m just
too tired and you’re quite a taxing person” could be
the truth but that’s a bit mean, and you didn’t want to
say that! versus “oh no sorry I have plans with my
boyfriend” which might be a lie, but it’s nice. ” (p6)
“Often you lie to save people’s feelings or – to stop
someone finding out about a surprise party. Like there
are really nice reasons to lie, and if you could help
people make nice lies safer, that would be awesome! ”
(p14)
P6 commented that this could be a subtle method of signalling
violations of personal privacy online:
“The idea of being able to put massively sarcastic cal-
endar appointments just so that, when someone looks
at my calendar to see what I’m doing, they know I
don’t want them to know, and they should just stop
asking. ” (p6)
Such methods were also viewed as a form of civil empowerment;
a way of giving people freedom to block off time (lieCalendar)
or send a message (Social Steganography) in situations where the
honest approach would be awkward due to shyness, introversion, or
differences in social positions, e.g. having to contradict a superior
in a social or professional environment.
“Somebody younger, less experienced, less confident
might find that this is a nice, straightforward way of
blocking time out for themselves and feeling good or
comfortable about it. Because it can be quite difficult
saying “no, I’m not free” to someone senior. ” (p8)
5.9 Ethics and Morality
Finally, many of the participants volunteered their views on eth-
ical or moral reasons of why they would or would not use these
tools in specific ways. Perspectives varied in general and accord-
ing to the vignette presented.
The technology vignettes could be seen as ethically neutral, with
the ethics coming from the manner of their use:
“ If your intention is to use these tools to harm some-
one, then that’s the individual’s own decision to make
and you can decide for yourself whether that’s morally
right or wrong. But simply using the tools themselves
doesn’t imply you’re going to do something that is
harmful or morally wrong. ” (p5)
“ Ultimately, this is just like any other cracking soft-
ware: you leave it to the user to decide what to do with
it. You’re not responsible for their moral actions, or at
least that’s what the developers say. ” (p4)
However, in some cases, there was such a strong implication be-
tween the design of the tool and the kinds of lies which it facilitates
that the morality of the tool became the morality of the action:
“Well as someone who’s considered murdering people
before, this is exactly how I would do it. I would create
a fake social media presence so I could go off and do
something illegal or even . . . I could commit adultery,
I really can’t see much of a practical application for
ethically good things. . . ” (p14, discussing lieTinerary)
To P6, whether deception was moral contextually dependant on
whether the recipient had a legitimate need for the truth and why.
“ If someone has a right to know something for some
reason [...] then lying to them there is more problem-
atic than if they didn’t have a right to ask you, or to be
looking for that information. [...] that’s their own fault;
they should have know they shouldn’t have looked. ”
(p6)
Some participants suggested that they would need a really good
reason to use deception tools. P14 felt that a better alternative to
having to lie was to get out of situations in which one felt the need
to lie.
“ And if you’re in a situation where you have to lie to
people about where you are, then that’s a situation you
need to get out of cos that’s a creepy situation [...] The
only time I can see this being good is like if you’re
in an abusive marriage and you’re going to a divorce
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lawyer in secret. ” (p14)
There was often a moral distinction made between friends and
platforms as the targets of deception. While a majority (11) re-
ported taking issue with deliberately deceiving friends, there was
also widespread consensus on wanting not to deceive a general au-
dience on social media. A notable exception to this was a feeling
that lying to platforms is not dishonest.
“well if I’m talking to my friend I always tell the truth;
I think I’m quite an honest person, and I don’t really
discuss anything with any other people in that sort of
way which I’d lie about,. . . I don’t think lying to Face-
book is unethical [. . . ], because it’s not affecting any
of your friends or anyone on your list, so it has no ef-
fect – so you’re not really lying to anyone? [...] I don’t
trust these companies enough, to be honest, with the
information I supply them. ” (p9)
P6 took the position that lying to platforms should be the moral
choice, even part of one’s civic duty.
“ I think lying to Facebook is to be encouraged! [plat-
forms] spend so much effort in deceiving users into
thinking they’re doing one thing when they’re doing
another, that giving users some control seems fine. Its
sort of like the debate whether minorities can be racist
against white people – like, whether the power imbal-
ance seems to negate any meaningful argument, cer-
tainly when it comes to lying to services. ” (p6)
6. DISCUSSION
6.1 Morality of Deception
Our participants, like the majority of people, like to think of
themselves as being generally honest, but this has a nuanced rela-
tionship with their stated behaviour. There was a common feeling
that deceiving platforms and corporations was acceptable, or even
a moral imperative. Nomenclature was significant: casting activ-
ities as ‘lying’ provoked responses which paid more attention to
the ramifications of being found out, and a greater sense of ethi-
cal violation. Hiding information was generally seen as acceptable,
as was partitioning information for different audiences, especially
in the context of avoiding unwanted attention. Politeness was of-
ten cited as a valid reason for performing white lies, a variety of
kindness.
Akerlof and Schiller’s account [2] focuses on deception from the
point of view of corporations, and therefore helps explain the ex-
istence of situations in which our survey subjects were motivated
to deceive. In the information economy, data subjects are beguiled,
misled or strongarmed into giving away more data than is required
for the service they wish to access. However, perhaps because their
focus is wider than the information economy, Akerlof and Schiller
fail to consider the possibility of the individual creating counter-
asymmetries by manipulating the data they provide to corporations.
Their recommended counter-measures are all intended to support
truthfulness - standards-setting, reputation, regulation. Yet these
all require concerted action; deception is a strategy open to the in-
dividual.
6.2 Promoting Social Honesty
One viewpoint is that mendacious impulses are indicative of a
problematic situation: that fixing the socio-technical context would
remove the need to deceive, and the community could become
more socially honest. Systems requesting excessive information
frequently provoked anger, and a feeling that feeding back ficti-
tious information was justified. One lens for designers to engage
with this issue is Grice’s conversational maxims. Typically, these
are used to define one side of a social contract: the quantity, qual-
ity, relation and manner of information production. A complimen-
tary view applies them to requests for information. This accounts
for many of the indignant quotes we recieved—systems were ask-
ing for too much information, or irrelevant information. Providing
clarity here, relating information demands to the current context,
limiting information to the that which is necessary can guide de-
signers towards upholding the platform’s end of the social contract.
Our lieMapper vignette asked how far through our social networks
personal information was likely to diffuse, alerting the user to so-
cial information violations; similarly, when designers illuminate
the hidden pathways which our data takes—or doesn’t—it provides
a grounding on which trust can be built.
Legal identities, and the problems which they cause, highlight
the multifacted aspects of life, whether online or off. The gen-
eral trend is towards a collapse of context, the joining of identities
across sites and networks, but the attitude that people should be
happy to connect all of their identities together in this way is an ex-
pression of social privilege. Tools exist to aid the management of
multiple personas, typically used by astroturfing organisations [35,
30]. As a provocation, what would design for multifaceted life look
like? Are there ways to support participants in plural presenta-
tion, helping them to understand and maintain their context bounds,
rather than attempting to force a homogenisation. How can we sup-
port radical self expression and support marginalised groups? What
about systems which acknowledge that there are parts of users lives
which they don’t want to share publicly, but they still need to ex-
press them and connect with similar people? Designing for contex-
tual authenticity rather than imposing singular identity pushes back
against marginalisation.
6.3 Memory, Safety, and Plausible Deniability
It was clear from responses that being reminded of one’s lies can
be upsetting, especially for people who consider themselves hon-
est. On one hand, this might suggest systems might automatically
remove, or reduce the visibility of, digital traces that could serve
as reminders of one’s past deceit. The recent growth in messaging
apps that automatically delete messages after a single viewing [23]
might, in fact, be related to this perceived design need. On the other
hand, visibility of such actions can lead people towards greater
honesty—knowing how often one was deceptive could clearly be
a powerful push towards veracity.
A second major theme pertained to effort, both of use and po-
tentially of maintenance, post-deceit. It was clear that any tool that
required more time and effort than what they were used to was pre-
ceived as not very useful. But having to explicitly act at all was
also viewed negatively; that is, having to engage with a tool in or-
der to carry out a deception, such as with lieCal, was viewed less
favourably than something that could do it automatically, such as
lieMoves.
An additional problem with tools that require explicit action is
that they leave little space for plausible deniability. Since explicit
action is needed, it becomes often difficult to justify that such an
action was taken accidentally or unintentionally (assuming the in-
dividual was of sound mind). If we had instead imagined tools that
deceived by default, the possibility that deception was unintended,
but that the individual was busy or simply forgot to make the sys-
tem tell the truth would still be plausible. For example, a deceive by
default variation of lieCal might automatically fill the person’s cal-
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endar for the following week or month, allowing its user to quickly
identify and replace these false appointments with real ones they
want others to know about. Such designs would additionally sup-
port many of the goals of privacy-by-design [48].
Another significant barrier to the use of such tools pertained to
safety and discoverability, the first pertaining to ensuring that de-
ceptive actions would not have unintended consequences, while the
second pertained to effort and actions that would be necessary to
ensure deceptive actions would not be discovered. Such concerns
suggest that there is a potential space for future tools that are able
to support safe deception, both in terms of highlighting potential
hazards and towards mitigating the burden of managing active lies
or their effects. Tools such as lieMapper that provided situational
awareness about social information flow could help individuals tell
certain, especially nice lies (as described by P8), safely.
7. CONCLUSION
Deception is a long-established strategy for informational self-
determination, and it is not a surprise to see the practice in online
behaviour. The study reported here is a necessary prolegomenon
to the deep study of deception, and establishes interesting lines of
enquiry which mark out a descriptive vocabulary, a potential design
space, and even the beginnings of a sketch of a bottom up morality
in this area.
Nissenbaum outlined the importance of contextual integrity for
online design, the idea that individuals bring a set of expectations
and meanings to their online interactions that are often derived from
oﬄine analogues, appropriately or otherwise. A designed interac-
tion that leaves no space for someone to present themselves cre-
atively for non-malevolent purposes fails to preserve contextual in-
tegrity, and would consequently produce an asymmetry of under-
standing between user and system of which the user may be un-
aware.
Particular strategies and opportunities for deception were com-
mon to many of our subjects, who were often concerned with the
balance between the moral injunction against lying, and their own
interests. Mitigating factors were sought - for example, if the inter-
locutor in the interaction is non-human (a platform, for instance),
or if the interaction provided an opportunity for malign action (e.g.
could be used by a stalker), or if the interlocutor did not have a good
reason for wanting the data, then these were seen as justifications
for using deception for protection. Morally, there are of course is-
sues with this – in particular, whether deceivers are free-riding on
the efforts of a truthful majority. Deception is a successful strat-
egy for self-protection, but presumably the deceiver also wants the
benefits of the interaction, which may not be forthcoming if inter-
actions with other agents also produced false data. However, the
moral calculation that our subjects were compared their own inter-
ests and the legitimacy of the interests of whoever demanded the
data.
This suggests design principles which could be tested in future
work. Those providing services for data need to identify, respect
and avoid the factors which lead users to deception. The act of
deception creates a situation in which data minimisation is in the
interests of the platform – the less that it asks for, the more likely
it is to be trusted, and the less likely the deception strategy is to be
invoked. In particular, contextual integrity is preserved if users are
able to represent themselves differently in different contexts, and it
is clear to them that the more data that is demanded, the easier it
is to resolve these personas. Similarly, there is a set of deceptions,
such as butler lies, which are adapted to specific communication
situations, and facilitating these will also help transfer and preserve
expectations in the digital context. Systems which facilitate decep-
tion will have both positive and negative potential. Most obviously,
their wide uptake would reduce trust in data generally. On the other
hand, it is clear from our survey that for most people, deception is
a last resort, and the majority self-image is one of general honesty
so that deception would demand ad hoc justification. The rather
more calculated invocation of a deception system might, if such at-
titudes were widespread, be a step too far. Framing the objective of
the system will be key – for example, classifying such systems as
privacy-enhancing, rather than deceiving, might increase their ac-
ceptance. On the other hand, software that maintained a consistent,
false, record of events might remove the burden from users of un-
derstanding that their behaviour is deceptive, and make it easier to
deceive. Such divergent potential outcomes require investigation.
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